Somali Piracy Activity

Date issued: 24 June 2026

“Somali Pirate Action Group activity intensified during June, with at least five suspicious approaches reported in the Gulf of Aden alone. The nature of these incidents became increasingly aggressive, with attackers frequently opening fire. Although three merchant vessels were successfully hijacked between 21 April and 2 May, no successful hijackings of transiting merchant vessels were reported thereafter. Particularly the adherence to BMP-MS and embarkation of Private Armed Security Teams reduced the effectiveness of Somali piracy.”

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• Two tankers and a general cargo ship highly likely remained under the control of Somali pirate action groups (PAGs).  
• The vessels are currently held in Somali Indian Ocean territorial seas in known holding areas. 
• The vessels were hijacked between 21 April and 2 May 2026, since then no further hijacking occurred. 
• Seven suspicious approaches were recorded since the last hijacking, four in the past week alone. 
• Approaches increasingly occur along or north of the International Recommended Transit Corridor in the Gulf of Aden. While the threat near Somali waters is not absent, vessels should account for the spread of suspected piracy activity across the Gulf of Aden. 
• Prevailing weather conditions in the Indian Ocean likely facilitate the enhanced piracy activity in the Gulf of Aden. The Monsoon Season is set to last until approximately September. 
• Somali PAGs continue to operate opportunistically, with recent incidents confirming the known capability.  
• Armed security highly likely prevented the hijacking of further merchant vessels. 

SITUATION

Since the first successful hijacking of a merchant vessel on 21 April 2026, piracy activity off Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden has evolved from a series of successful hijackings targeting vulnerable vessels to a sustained campaign of suspicious approaches and armed attacks against merchant shipping. Between 21 April and early May, four vessels were successfully hijacked, including two product tankers, a general cargo vessel, and a dhow. These vessels shared common vulnerabilities, including low freeboards (0.8–2.1 metres), slow speeds or anchorage positions, and the apparent absence of embarked armed security teams. Boarding parties typically consisted of six to eleven armed individuals operating from one or more skiffs and equipped with AK-pattern rifles and, in some cases, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). 

Following these hijackings, pirate activity shifted towards repeated approaches against merchant vessels rather than successful boardings. During May, several suspected Pirate Action Groups were sighted operating north of Bosaso and west of Socotra, while multiple merchant vessels reported approaches by small boats carrying five to eight individuals. Naval intervention, particularly by Indian Navy units and Operation ATALANTA, disrupted PAGs before further attacks could be executed. 

Activity intensified during June, with at least five suspicious approaches reported in the Gulf of Aden alone. The nature of these incidents became increasingly aggressive, with attackers frequently opening fire. Weapons employed included automatic rifles and RPGs, with several incidents involving sustained exchanges of fire between pirates and embarked Private Armed Security Teams (PAST). Despite the increased aggression, no merchant vessels were successfully hijacked during this period.  

THREAT UPDATE

On 2 May, the EUREKA was hijacked near Yemen and sailed to Somalia’s east coast for ransom negotiations. This was the first hijacking of a merchant vessel in the Gulf of Aden since the resurgence of Somali piracy in November 2023. Throughout May and June, suspected PAG activity centred on the Gulf of Aden, with incidents increasingly occurring north of the IRTC, in waters previously considered relatively unaffected by Somali piracy. Though incidents occurred in the Gulf of Aden prior to the effects of the southwest monsoon, the prevailing weather conditions are likely to manifest a persistent piracy threat in the Gulf of Aden. The monsoon is set to end in September. 

This period demonstrates an increase in operational tempo. Following four successful hijackings between 21 April and early May, piracy activity shifted from isolated boardings to frequent approaches and attempted attacks. While May featured intermittent suspicious approaches and PAG sightings, June saw a marked increase in incident frequency, culminating in five reported attacks in the Gulf of Aden during a single month. This suggests that pirate groups retained operational capability despite naval disruption and increasingly sought opportunities to engage merchant traffic. Boarding attempts increasingly involve aggressive high-speed approaches against underway vessels, often with one or two skiffs carrying between five and twelve personnel. PAGs routinely employ AK-style automatic rifles, while RPGs featured in several June incidents. Pirates frequently attempted to close to within a few cables of their targets before opening fire. Merchant vessels responded by implementing BMP measures, including evasive manoeuvres, increased speed, alarms, water jets, and the deployment of embarked armed security teams. 

Although three merchant vessels were successfully hijacked between 21 April and 2 May, no successful hijackings of transiting merchant vessels were reported thereafter. The widespread use of BMP measures and particularly the effectiveness of embarked PASTs significantly reduced pirate effectiveness. In nearly every incident involving armed security, warning shots or return fire caused attackers to disengage before boarding could be attempted. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

• If transiting within a high-risk area, conduct a ship security assessment prior to transiting the region and rigorously apply ship protection measures as per industry guidelines. These should include Anti-Boarding and Climbing (ABaC) systems. 
• Vessels should implement BMP-MS measures, including a hardened and sufficiently equipped citadel to withstand a hijacking of the vessel for several hours until military assistance can be arranged.  
• Ensure 24-hour watches are conducted when transiting through high-risk areas and piracy drills are conducted prior to entering the area. 
• If vulnerable, it is advised to embark a minimum of three armed guards on transits through Ambrey’s dynamic elevated threat areas offshore Somalia. This is to ensure round-the-clock armed watches. Additional guards may be advisable depending on the vessel’s specifications.  
• If it is possible, Ambrey recommends transiting through Ambrey’s elevated threat area off Somalia at night. 

CONTACT INFORMATION

Ambrey: +44 203 503 0320, intelligence@ambrey.com

AMBREY – For Every Seafarer, Every Vessel, Everywhere.