
AMBREY THREAT CIRCULAR > US INTERVENTION IN THE ISRAEL-IRAN CONFLICT – UPDATE 001
Source: This document has been approved for distribution by Ambrey Analytics Ltd.
Updated:
This supersedes Ambrey Threat Circular – US intervention in the Israel-Iran conflict, dated 23 June 2025.
A. Executive Summary
- Iran responded to the US strike on its nuclear sites by targeting a US base in Qatar.
- The Iranians framed their response as proportionate to the US strikes, and US President Trump dismissed the attack.
- The US President Trump subsequently announced a ceasefire.
- The risk of further attacks on US military bases or a threat to their merchant shipping is assessed to be lowered.
- Both Iran and Israel publicly agreed to the ceasefire, though Israel has since reported a breach, and vowed a response.
- President Trump has declared he was “unhappy” with both Iran and Israel over this.
- There is a realistic possibility that the conflict between Israel and Iran will continue/restart, and there may be subsequent US involvement, but the risk of US involvement is assessed to have lowered.

B. SITUATION
On 23rd June, Iran launched retaliatory strikes on the Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar. This hosts the US Air Force, the Qatar Emiri Air Force, and other foreign forces. Reports and video indicated the missiles were intercepted, or missed, and there were no casualties. Iran signalled that their response was over by claiming they matched the number of missiles the US fired at their nuclear sites. Following this, President Trump dismissed the attack and signalled that the US would not respond.
President Trump subsequently announced a ceasefire. Iran’s Foreign Minister issued a statement that, whilst there was no ceasefire agreement, Iran had “no intention of continuing to respond” if Israel stopped its attacks. Israel’s President Netanyahu agreed to a ceasefire Tuesday morning. However, approximately an hour following President Netanyahu’s statement, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) announced that they detected missile launches from Iran and intercepted a missile. Israel’s Defence Minister instructed the IDF to respond. President Trump then addressed Israel on social media: “Israel. Do not drop those bombs. If you do it is a major violation.”
C. THREAT UPDATE
Since the start of Israeli airstrikes on Iran on 13th June, no merchant shipping has been damaged or seized. Ambrey assesses the risk to US merchant shipping to have lowered. There is a realistic possibility of Iran targeting Israel-affiliated shipping. There is assessed to be a lowered risk to US merchant shipping because of the demonstrated willingness of the US administration to cease military operations, and given that the Iranians chose not to respond to the US strikes by targeting shipping. Despite the reported breach of the ‘ceasefire’, the US need not militarily intervene, and President Trump’s address to Israel further indicates a US willingness to stop operations. On 6th May 2025, the US came to a separate agreement with the Houthis, which did not stop or further punish subsequent Houthi attacks on Israel. If Israel and Iran were to continue to exchange strikes, the US may choose to once again diverge, particularly if the US assesses its strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites have had the intended impact.
Evidence of publicly-US merchant ship transits of the Strait of Hormuz
Before/after the Iranian strike on Al-Udeid (16:39 UTC 23 Jun 25) | Inbound/Outbound to the Arabian/Persian Gulf | Type of public US affiliation | Count of vessels |
Before | Inbound | Ownership listing | 2 |
Operatorship | 1 | ||
Outbound | The flag and ownership | 1 | |
Ownership | 2 | ||
Ownership listing | 2 | ||
After | Inbound | Ownership | 1 |
Ownership listing | 1 | ||
Operatorship | 1 | ||
Outbound | Ownership listing | 3 | |
Operatorship | 1 |
In the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, Ambrey assesses that the Houthis are unlikely to now target US merchant shipping. The risk is likely to return to the status quo established since 6th May 2025.
D. MITIGATION
- Affiliation checks against the Iran target profile: Ambrey recommends a thorough affiliation check as part of a transit risk assessment is performed for Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman, Arabian/Persian Gulf, Gulf of Aden and southern Red Sea voyages. Ambrey continues to adjust these as per the developing intent and threat.
- Shipping companies are welcome to have a conversation with Ambrey to talk through scenarios.
- Vessels strongly affiliated with the target profile are advised to avoid the Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman, Arabian/Persian Gulf, Gulf of Aden and southern Red Sea where possible. The effect of US interests has been lowered.
- If the company is in these regions, it would be advised to limit aggregate risk, by people, hull, and value to an acceptable level.
- Ship Security Assessments: Merchant shipping assessed to be at heightened risk is advised to carry out Ship Security Assessments tailored to the threat, and to implement recommended and proportionate ship protection measures before sailing.
- Bridge support: Unarmed advisors to prepare and reassure crew and assist with military liaison. Digital operations can also support with route planning, voyage preparation, and keep the bridge and shore staff informed of any changes in risk while enroute.
E. CONTACT INFORMATION
Ambrey: +44 203 503 0320 – intelligence@ambrey.com
AMBREY – For Every Seafarer, Every Vessel, Everywhere.
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