AMBREY THREAT CIRCULAR> RENEWED SUSPECTED SOMALI PIRATE ACTIVITY

Date issued: 05 November 2025

Source: This document has been approved for distribution by Ambrey Analytics Ltd.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• It is highly likely that a Somali Pirate Action Group (PAG) is at sea, and has been operating more than 300NM offshore Somalia.
• This group is likely connected to the hijacking of a dhow offshore Garacad, are probably using this as a mothership, and are likely linked to a report of pirate activity in Nugaal, Puntland.
• There are local reports of a possible second PAG gathering in Bari, Puntland, attempting to hire skiffs from local fishermen.
• There has already been an exchange of fire with a Private Armed Security Team (PAST) onboard a Cayman Islands-flagged tanker. There was an earlier approach toward a Seychelles-flagged seiner, likely deterred with warning shots by another PAST.
• Those approached matched the known target profiles and capabilities of Somali pirates.
• Pirates have been able to launch attacks at distances of up to 800NM from Somalia, but the speed and incident locations of the current PAG indicates a heightened risk within the Indian Ocean listed area, and along its immediate boundary.
• The risk is voyage- and vessel-specific. For those at heightened risk, established risk mitigation measures work.

SITUATION

On 26 October, an Iranian dhow was boarded offshore Garacad. This stretch of Somali coast has seen an uptick in Somali piracy since late 2023. In the vicinity of this area, PAGs have held merchant vessels for ransom.

On 2 November, a Seychelles-flagged seiner was approached by a small boat 365NM from Mogadishu, 340NM offshore Somalia. The skiff’s mothership was displaying the name ISSAMOHAMADI2. No weapons or boarding equipment were reported. An embarked PAST issued warning shots, and the skiff returned to the mothership.

The following day, and only 36NM from the approach toward the fishing vessel, a Cayman Islands-flagged tanker was approached. This was 330NM from Mogadishu, and 290NM offshore Somalia. The suspects came to within 1 cable of the tanker. After the embarked PAST issued warning shots, the suspects reportedly opened fire with several rounds. The firearm used by the suspects was described as an AK-variant. Following an exchange of fire with the PAST, the suspects returned to a nearby unidentified mothership.

Ambrey has received a separate report that a group of 12 suspected pirates were attempting to hire three skiffs in Bari, Puntland.

ANALYSIS

These events, and others in recent years, have indicated that PASTs continue to be highly effective at denying boarding attempts. Watchkeeping and crew mustering in citadels have also proven effective in preventing pirates gaining control of merchant vessels.

The indicative speed of the mothership based on these events was less than 5kts. The vessel may be transiting at such low speeds to conserve fuel.

With the end of the Monsoon, sea conditions in the Indian Ocean are expected to remain permissive for piracy.

The tanker was estimated to have a 5.6m freeboard. This was within the known capability of Somali PAGs. There have been no reports of a ladder, but these groups have previously used grapnels. Therefore, there is a realistic possibility they can scale higher freeboards.

Ambrey had received a report that this group was armed with a PKM-style weapon. None of these recent incidents included reports of an area weapon or suppressive fire.

Puntland coast guard and police forces have acted decisively against identified PAGs in Puntland and its coastal waters. In recent months, they have arrested eleven suspects in connection with the ransoming of the bulker ABDULLAH. This recent activity underlines the challenges in effectively suppressing piracy.

MITIGATION

• Ship Security Assessments: Merchant shipping transiting the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean is advised to carry out Ship Security Assessments tailored to the threat of piracy, and to implement recommended and proportionate ship protection measures before sailing.
• Live monitoring: Intelligence providers can link merchant vessels from many companies, and can link into military organizations to provide real-time awareness of ongoing dhow hijackings and small boat activities, enabling shipping to respond with route adjustments and enhancing crew preparedness.
• Voyage Risk Assessments: Merchant shipping is advised to carry out voyage- and vessel-specific risk assessments in advance of transits.
• Private Armed Security Teams: Proportionate embarkation of a PAST can enable merchant shipping to optimise voyage plans, saving time, fuel consumption, and carbon emissions.

CONTACT INFORMATION

Ambrey: +44 203 503 0320, intelligence@ambrey.com

AMBREY – For Every Seafarer, Every Vessel, Everywhere.

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